

SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS.

Vol. II.

Richmond, Va., September, 1876.

No. 3.

Resources of the Confederacy in February, 1865.

[Continued from August Number.]

RICHMOND, February 16, 1865.

Hon. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, *Secretary War* :

Sir—In response to your circular of the 7th instant, calling for a statement of the means and resources on hand for carrying on the business of this bureau, &c., &c., I have the honor to call your attention to the following papers:

1st. A statement prepared by Major Cole, in reference to the requirements of the service as to *field transportation*, and the means necessary for meeting the demand. This paper shows the great scarcity of horses in the country, and the difficulty of procuring them, together with the measures being adopted for the purpose. The great obstacle at present is the want of funds.

2d. A statement from Major Cross, relative to the supply of clothing, present and prospective. The difficulties encountered in this branch of the department arise from scarcity of wool, the frequent stopping of the work by ordering away the operatives, and the want of funds.

3d. A communication from Lieutenant-Colonel Sims, as to the condition of railroad transportation, the wants of the railroads, &c. The chief difficulties encountered there arise from defective machinery, and the impossibility of supplying new, the want of legislation giving the Government proper control over railroads and their employees, and the want of funds to pay the roads so as to keep them in as good condition as the blockade and the limited resources of the country will permit. Several special communications on this subject have been addressed by this bureau to the Hon. Secretary of War. At present this department has no control over railroads except so much as has been yielded by contract or courtesy.

The supply of grain and long forage *in the country* is believed to be quite enough to supply the public animals, but no distinct opinion can be hazarded as to the ability of this bureau to supply it to the *armies* during the coming campaign, as so much will depend on the relative positions of the different armies, and the preservation or destruction of our lines of transportation.

To sum up, I venture to state that this bureau can conduct its operations with success enough to sustain our armies, if labor is

allowed to the various work shops on which it depends, without interruption, if the privilege of detailing contractors under certain circumstances be continued, and the necessary funds are promptly furnished. Without these this department is powerless, and the want of them is fast paralyzing its efforts.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed)

A. R. LAWTON,
Quartermaster-General.

OFFICE INSPECTOR-GENERAL, FIELD TRANSPORTATION,
Richmond, February 1st, 1865.

General LAWTON, *Quartermaster-General:*

Sir—The urgent request of General Lee, made to me in person, and that of his Chief Quartermaster, to be prepared to equip his artillery and transportation with horses, added to the calls made upon me for the same supplies for armies South, induces me to address you this communication, in which I desire to recapitulate what I have before at different times, in writing and verbally, had the honor to submit to you, on the subject of the number of animals needed to equip our armies for the spring campaign, and the source from which such supplies are to be obtained.

As the officer charged with the providing of horses and mules for the armies of the Confederate States, I feel it to be due to myself for the record to show, that I have taken all necessary steps to a proper discharge of my duty, to ascertain the resources of the country, and to suggest plans by which deficiencies may be supplied, and that, should the demand made on me not be met, and any damage result from such failure, I may be exculpated from blame, by reference to my official communications.

The inability of the Confederate States east of the Mississippi to sustain the draft which would be made for horses and mules for the coming campaign, was discussed and announced by me in May last, when I was procuring such supplies for General Johnston's army. The number estimated by me at that time to be necessary must be largely increased, by reason of the losses sustained in General Hood's campaign in Tennessee.

In May last I dispatched an officer to General E. K. Smith, Commanding Department of the Trans-Mississippi, with letters to him announcing our necessities, and urging him to send us a portion of the animals which he was reported to have captured from the Federal army, and asking that funds might be furnished, and permission granted to my officer, charged with the business, to go into Mexico, and procure animals, to be sent over this side. In both I was disappointed, and in August following I suggested the plan, since adopted and sought to be executed, of procuring a large number of animals from Mexico. Owing to the delays in procuring the funds, and from the fact that no one has yet been selected to proceed to Texas in charge of the operations to be undertaken, we

cannot expect to receive a first instalment from Mexico under three or four months, and even should General Smith consent to furnish us any out of his supply (which I have again asked him for) we cannot receive them before about the middle of March, and to obtain any at all now within the period named, a proper officer must be in Texas to conduct business.

I have also proposed that I shall be provided with means and authority to procure supplies and animals from the enemy's lines, which I have every reason to feel assured can be done to a large extent. I am informed by my officers, certainly reliable, that horses and mules can be obtained deliverable in Mississippi, payable in cotton on the following terms, viz: first class artillery horses for 600 pounds of cotton; second class artillery for 500 pounds; and third class for 400 pounds; but to do this, my officers must have the cotton in hand so as to receive the animals and deliver the cotton at such times and places as opportunity offers.

In Virginia the prices asked, payable in gold, are for first class \$60, and it is thought that two thousand can be obtained in that way. The number that can be obtained in Mississippi in a space of two or three months is put down at (2,000) two thousand.

I have before informed you, that according to my information, there will be needed for the armies of the Confederate States at least six thousand horses, and four thousand five hundred mules. The number to be procured in the Confederate States east of the Mississippi by impressment depends on the decision which may be made, as to the quantity of animals the farmers will be allowed to keep, as essential to their operations. I estimate the supply to be obtained from all sources (provided I am furnished means) not to exceed (5,000) five thousand animals on this side of the Mississippi. This leaves a deficit of (5,500) five thousand five hundred to fill my estimate.

If the horses are not supplied, the military operations are checked and may be frustrated. If the farmers are stripped of a portion of the animals essential to the conduct of their agricultural operations, there must be a corresponding reduction of supplies of food for man and horse. Convinced, as I am, that the best and only means of procuring the needed supply of animals are those that I have indicated, feeling deeply the pressure of the demands made and to be made on me to furnish such supplies, dreading the consequences of a failure to meet such calls, and fearing that I may be exposed to censure for such failure, I respectfully urge that I may be immediately put in possession of the necessary means to carry into effect the plans for providing the necessary animals, than which I confess myself unable to suggest any other; or that, in case it shall be decided that my plans are impracticable, and the means I ask for cannot be furnished, that I may be relieved from the duty I am now performing, and some one be appointed in my stead, who can dispense with what I consider, and have stated to be indispensable, to enable me to successfully perform the duty.

I think it proper to again repeat what I have before asked to have done, in order to secure the needed supplies:

First. With respect to the operations in Mexico and Texas, I estimated that the sum of £350,000 in sterling or gold turned over to me, say at the rate of £100,000 per quarter, would enabled me to obtain about (15,000) fifteen thousand animals at the rate of about \$60 per head.

I was informed by you that this amount would be furnished by the Treasury. I received letters of credit for £50,000, and sent it to Texas by Major W. S. Harris, and further amounts are now required. An officer to control and manage the business is wanted, one possessing the qualifications which I had the honor to state I deemed requisite. No one has been yet assigned to the duty. Nothing can be done until such officer arrives in Texas.

Second. The purchase of horses and mules to be delivered in Mississippi from the enemy's lines to be successful, must be conducted on this simple plan: The officer who receives the horses must have in his hands the cotton to make instant payment. It must be at suitable points for being carried off easily. He must not be trammelled by officers of other branches of the service, and so situated as to be able to fulfill his engagements promptly and surely. If he is to get his cotton paid through treasury agents (and not allowed to purchase it himself), and be governed by them as to the price he is to pay for horses, I fear he will fail to carry out the object.

Third. To obtain horses in Virginia, gold or Federal money is essential. They can be purchased for gold at rates below those prevailing before the war. This is not the case with other articles of military supply in the Confederate States obtained from abroad by the Government. I am induced to believe that two thousand horses can be had in a short space of time along the lines of Virginia and North Carolina from the enemy's lines, if money can be supplied, and at prices, perhaps, not greater than we expect to pay in Mexico.

I beg leave respectfully to request that I may be officially informed as soon as practicable of the decision in reference to the beforementioned subjects, in order that I may be enabled to give General Lee an exact statement, showing to what extent he can rely on this office for the animals deemed necessary to place his army on a footing for active service in the spring.

I have not been able so far to reply fully to General Lee's inquiries, for the reasons herein stated, as remaining open for determination.

I have the honor to be, sir,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. H. COLE,

Major Inspector-General Freight Transportation, C. S. A.

RICHMOND, January 27th, 1865.

Sir—I submit herewith, in response to your recent call, a report which shows the issues within the past six months to the armies in the field. A little delay has occurred, awaiting the receipt of reports of issues, due from distant points in the Confederacy. The report shows the issues to General Lee's command from July 1st to January 21st, and to other commands from July 1st to January 21st, except that the report of issues for the Departments of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana are still due for the month of December. I was gratified that information now given was asked, for the impression is so common that our armies are poorly provided for, that I gladly avail of an opportunity to show what has been done.

I enclose also a copy of General Orders No. 100, which regulates the allowance of clothing yearly. This table of supply, adopted from the old service, was made with reference to abundant resources, and doubtless shows what will answer the necessities of a soldier with fair economy and management. This Department has never aimed to limit its issues to this standard, especially in regard to jackets and pants, but has endeavored to provide a suit of clothing every six months for each man. When it is considered that the issues now reported are field issues proper, and exclusive of issues to men in hospitals, of issues to men on furlough, of issues to detailed men at posts, of issues to paroled and exchanged men, of issues to retired men, and of all last issues whatever, it will be found, I think, that with the exception of overcoats, which have not been made up, owing to the great consumption of woollen material for jackets and pants, and the item of flannel undershirts, but partially supplied, the armies have been fully supplied. I do not hesitate to say that in some instances there has been extravagance, and moreover, that much of the individual want that strikes the eye is due to the improvidence of the soldiers, who too often dispose, by sale and barter, of what they have received. It is proper to add that this report includes but a portion of the issues made by the State of North Carolina to her troops, and no other State issues whatever, although it is known that other States have contributed liberally. Georgia, for instance, has issued within the past year as follows: 26,795 jackets, 28,808 pairs of pants, 37,657 pairs of shoes, 7,504 blankets, 24,952 shirts, 24,168 pairs of drawers and 23,024 pairs of socks, but as the apportionment thereof between the various armies does not appear, these issues are not noted. Add to all the issues made by numerous relief associations and through individual contributions, and it will show that in the past we have at least needed an economical expenditure and proper distribution of supplies, more than anything else, to secure the comfort and efficiency of our armies. The issues of shirts, drawers, socks and caps may in some instances appear light. This is due to the fact that in previous quarters, through the abundance of these articles, the troops have been fully supplied. It has always been understood that all calls for these articles could be

responded to, and of some there is still a large supply on hand; for instance, in the depot at this point, over 100,000 pairs of socks and 25,000 pairs of drawers, besides excesses elsewhere.

In connection with the table of supply referred to, I will remark that the first year is reckoned to commence from October, 1862, when communication was abolished, so that now we are in the third year.

I will also add, as supplemental to the report recently made in regard to the sale of cloth, that the Department Officer at Montgomery, Alabama, has disposed of 7,000 yards single width, and that 1,000 suits are now being made up here for the officers of General Lee's command. This, with what has already been reported, shows that provision has been made for six thousand officers within the past six months. Very respectfully, &c.,

(Signed)

A. R. LAWTON,
Quarter-Master General.

Hon. Mr. MILLER, *Chairman Special Committee.*

(No. 2.)

Memorandum of Resources of Department—Clothing, Camp Equipment, and Miscellaneous Stores.

1. The enclosed report will show what has been furnished the armies of the Confederate States in the way of clothing within the past six months. The issues show a fair provision in all articles save overcoats and flannel jackets, and in some instances an extravagant consumption of supplies. The condition of the troops in connection with the issues made suggests, either an imperfect distribution of supplies, or waste on the part of the individual soldier, or it may be both. The latter is known to prevail to an extent that makes it a great abuse.

2. As to the future, the greatest difficulty will be to provide the raw material—wool and leather, the former especially. The manufacturing facilities are ample. Efforts are being made to supply the deficiency of wool from the Trans-Mississippi region, where it is abundant. Some deliveries have recently been made on this side. The wool is worked up as rapidly as had. By using cotton clothing during the summer and spring, and reserving the woollen goods for fall and winter, it is hoped and believed that enough may be had to prevent suffering next winter. We will get through this season without much trouble. There is a fair supply of leather, or hides in the vats, and a moderate supply of shoes on hand. The blankets now in the hands of the men must be turned in in the spring for reissue. As there is not in the entire Confederacy a single establishment that makes them, machinery has been ordered from abroad. The supply of cotton clothing has heretofore been abundant, and is now ample. There will be no difficulty hereafter on this head, at least so long as the railroad connections can be relied on to make the raw material of one section available in another. It is now very hard to keep the factories in Virginia even partially supplied with cotton.

To accomplish anything, however, it is really indispensable that some relief be extended, and that promptly, as follows:

1. *Money* or some equivalent must be had to keep the machinery of the department going. Arrearages especially should be provided for. For instance, over \$5,000,000 is now due to the factory interest alone for goods long since delivered and expended, and that, too, after a liberal use of call certificates, non-taxable bonds, and even the raw material, cotton. All the factories are under contract to deliver at fair prices two-thirds of their production. They all work under a uniform system, one built up with care and labor, and with a result perfectly satisfactory. The whole, unfortunately, is about to crumble in for want of funds; the factories being without the means to meet current expenditures, even at times to pay taxes. Their only relief is, to put their production upon the market, and the department is in no position to complain of the loss of material.

2. If money can be supplied, then the system of barter, now almost universal, should be checked, or at least placed under restrictions. The necessities of the Subsistence Bureau have compelled with it a free resort to barter. The Mining and Nitre Bureau has also gone largely into it. In Virginia, especially, this has been done. Material necessary for the manufacture of clothing for the army has been directed from its legitimate use. Thus cotton is expended here when the factories have stopped work for the want of same. Cotton yarns are made way with, when wanted for army socks, and also shirtings and osnaburgs needed for clothing and forage sacks. The Subsistence Bureau has now some 150 bales of osnaburgs stored here to be used in barter, and this Department is without a single yard of material to make into shirts or drawers.

General Lee represents his army to be in want of underclothing, and a call has recently been made for 12,000 shirts, which, for the first time, could not be sent forward promptly. That illustrates strongly the drawbacks resulting from an attempt to relieve the necessities of one branch of the service by diverting irregularly material due to another. If barter must continue, cannot it be restricted, and as far as possible articles like tobacco used in lieu of what goes to make up essential military supplies? The Department has struggled on successfully in the past, notwithstanding this serious difficulty, but some relief is needed for the future.

In the same way hides of beeves slaughtered by commissaries are made way with, though due to this Department under general orders, and absolutely essential to the continued supply of shoes to the army. The practice of purchasing beeves with the obligation to return the hides to the seller should be discontinued.

3. Some protection similar to that given to the factory operatives by Special Order No. 310, paragraph XXXII, should be extended to the detailed men of mechanical skill employed in the established work-shops of the Department, so as to guard against unnecessary interruptions, and cause great loss of supplies. With some relief

in these particulars, to develop home resources, and such aid as may be looked for from abroad, through contracts encouraging individual enterprize, a reasonable confidence is felt that a sufficiency of army clothing can be provided, at least for the present year.

These remarks apply equally to camp equipage and miscellaneous stores.

Respectfully submitted,

(Signed)

WM. B. B. Cross, Major.

ISSUES OF CLOTHING TO ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

	Jackets.	Pants.	Shoes.	Blankets.	Hats and Caps.	Flannel Shirts.	Cotton Shirts.	Drawers.	Socks.	Overcoats.
<i>General Lee's Command in Virginia:</i>										
Aggregate amount third and fourth } quarters 1864, and to January 31, 1865. }	104,199	140,578	167,862	74,881	27,011	21,063	157,727	170,139	146,136	4,361
<i>Army of Southwest Virginia:</i>										
Aggregate amount third and fourth } quarters 1864.	3,340	2,500	6,856	4,924	3,230	1,440	13,694	15,475	12,353	1,000
<i>Department of South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia—General Hardee:</i>										
Aggregate amount third and fourth } quarters 1864.	19,751	21,092	26,376	12,429	500	19,264	20,571	26,719	594
<i>Army of Tennessee:</i>										
Aggregate amount third and fourth } quarters 1864.	45,412	102,864	102,558	37,900	45,553	61,560	108,937	55,560	
<i>Department of Alabama, Mississippi and East Louisiana:</i>										
Aggregate amount third and fourth } quarters 1864.	21,759	37,661	34,342	4,677	27,292	10,095	9,831	15,463	
<i>Department of North Carolina:</i>										
Aggregate amount third and fourth } quarters 1864.	21,301	37,774	9,263	6,696	12,751	23,354	29,579	15,069	300

RICHMOND, February 10th, 1865.

General—In making the report you ordered, upon the condition and wants in regard to transportation by railroad, it may not be improper to call your attention to the cause of the difficulties which have always attended it with increasing force as this city is approached.

In North Carolina and Virginia, where transportation bears the most heavily because of its increasing volume as you approach Richmond, the roads are the least able to bear it. They were constructed and equipped to transport that great stream of travel between the North and South; and with no expectation of a heavy freighting business, prepared themselves with such machinery as was adapted to carrying a light train very rapidly. So long as the army could draw supplies from any quarter, and the lines running south as far as Wilmington and Charlotte, were called on only to transport men, the work was performed promptly and well, but when supplies failed in Virginia and North Carolina, and Georgia and South Carolina had to furnish them, an immense business was at once created upon those lines, which they were unprepared to meet. Their engines were light and few in number, and their cars the same. Had the gauge of the tracks south suited, machinery might have been drawn from there; but this not being so, we have had to struggle against a heavy business with inadequate means of performing it. Under these circumstances any machinery will depreciate; it is overworked and not well attended to, and must inevitably grow less reliable. New cars are being built, though the difficulties encountered retard the progress very much, but new engines cannot be manufactured in the Confederacy.

It becomes all important, then, that those we have should be preserved in good repair, and here we meet the really great difficulties arising from the scarcity of mechanics and materials.

The hardships of the war, and the fear of conscription, have induced many of this class to leave the Confederacy; most of them were natives of the United States. Feeling but little or no interest in our country or cause, they are generally of a roving and reckless character, forming attachments to places but rarely, and impatient of restraint. Many of them enlisted and have been killed, so that the number in the country has been constantly decreasing. This deficiency cannot be supplied as in ordinary times by the instruction of apprentices, because the conscript law takes them for the army just at the period when they are learning to be useful, nor can they be induced to come from abroad at the present pay, and with the fear of the army before them.

To the want of mechanics is to be added the want of materials. Not a single bar of railroad iron has been rolled in the Confederacy since the war, nor can we hope to do any better during its continuance. The main lines will be kept up by despoiling the side lines, but if our lines should expand and the rails and machinery be taken away by the enemy, we could not replace them. But

without discussing the supply of rails, which is in the hands of a special commission, there are many articles of iron which cannot be had because of its scarcity. Aside from iron there are copper, pig tin, steam gauges, cast steel, files, &c., &c., without which it is impossible to maintain engines. They are as necessary as iron. Heretofore a small supply has been had through Wilmington, but with that port closed, we are cut off entirely, except by trading with the enemy, and paying in cotton. With plenty of mechanics and material, the machinery now in use could be improved, and there would be a corresponding improvement in transportation; but it should be borne in mind, that as machinery grows older it takes more work to keep it in efficient condition, and therefore the same men and material now do not accomplish so much as at the commencement of the war.

Your earnest attention is called to the entire absence of responsibility of railroad officers to any military authority. It is true, there is a kind of moral influence exercised over them, rather from some undefined idea that the hand of Government can reach them, than from any other cause. The public, and indeed most of the officers, are under the impression that your bureau has supreme power over all the railroads and trains in the Confederacy, and had but to order them at your will to any point you desired. As to the men, they are exempt and enjoy almost entire immunity from the ordinary means of punishment. The only attempt yet made to render the railroads amenable to some authority, has resulted in a law so full of loop-holes that it is inoperative.

These are the main reasons why our railroad transportation is already deficient, and daily depreciating. Efforts are being made to purchase material, but success is quite uncertain. At present the want is not so serious as the want of mechanics, though it may become so if the materials are not obtained. It may not be out of place to mention that notwithstanding the scarcity and value of this kind of transportation, it receives but little protection or security from our armies, which seems strange when not only their comfort but their safety depends on its efficiency. As cases in point, and of recent date, is the loss of cars and engines at Atlanta, Griswoldville, Gordon and Savannah, footing up probably twenty-five engines and four hundred cars, or an equipment greater than we now have to work the Richmond and Danville Railroad.

I am, General,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

F. W. SIMS,

Lieutenant-Colonel Quartermaster.

Brigadier-General LAWTON, *Quartermaster-General.*

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Engineer Bureau,
 RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, 16th February, 1865.

Hon. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE, *Secretary War* :

Sir—I have somewhat delayed answering the circular from your office of the 7th instant, in order to present a more complete and satisfactory reply.

I now have the honor to submit the following statement of the means and resources for carrying on the service confided to this bureau, impediments thereto, and what is desired to promote greater and necessary efficiency.

To this end I propose to lay before you—

1st. A statement in regard to officers of engineers and engineer troops—their number, assignments and the necessary increase demanded by the interests of the service.

2d. Engineer workshops.

3d. Railroad repairs, including the collection of railroad iron by a special commission.

4th. Labor required for all the service confided to the engineer corps, whether military or civil, including its organization.

First, then, in regard to officers, there are—

In regular corps of engineers.....	13 officers.
In provisional corps of engineers.....	115 officers.
In engineer troops.....	105 officers.
Assigned to engineer duty	13 officers.
Total.....	246 officers.
Officers of regular corps on other duty.....	7 officers.
Total available for engineer service.....	239 officers.

The officers of the regular and provisional corps are distributed to the different armies and departments, in such manner as to meet the most urgent calls of the engineer service, and the companies of engineer troops are serving, as a general rule, with the armies and in the departments in which the divisions are, from which they are taken as follows:

Army of Northern Virginia.....	12 companies.
Army of Tennessee	10 companies.
Department of North Carolina.....	1 company.
Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida.....	2 companies.
District of the Gulf.....	1 company.
Trans-Mississippi Department.....	9 companies.
Total.....	35 companies.

Of these companies, three with the army of Tennessee, and three in the Trans-Mississippi Department have not as yet, however, been fully organized. It is proposed to create one more in the Trans-Mississippi, thus making a full regiment, and one more in

the Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, to be employed chiefly as artisans.

As there is still an urgent demand for engineer officers, an application has been made, on my recommendation, to Congress for (22) twenty-two additional officers in the provisional corps. This bill has passed the Senate, and will, it is hoped, at an early day be favorably considered by the House, and become a law. If so, nominations for suitable appointments will be promptly made by the bureau.

The assignments of the few military engineers, who joined the Southern army at the commencement of the war, to duty with troops, has been a serious drawback to the engineer service, which has therefore been performed in a great measure by civil engineers, who have been appointed from time to time in the corps.

2d. Engineer workshops, for the manufacture of tools, implements and preparation of material for pontoon bridges, have been established at Richmond, Charleston, Augusta, Mobile, Demopolis, and in the Trans-Mississippi Department, from which the calls from the different armies and departments have been, as far as practicable, supplied. The great difficulty in this direction has been the want of materials, particularly iron for tools and bridge constructions, a want owing principally to the disturbed condition of the country and defective transportation.

Entrenching tools have been obtained by importation to a considerable extent, and funds have been sent abroad to purchase others, but the closing of most of our regular ports of entry, it is feared, will prevent their being received.

3d. For the prompt repair of railroad bridges and trestlework, and for duplicating these last, an organized body of mechanics should be available. This has been partly provided for, but it is proposed to increase the force, if practicable, to at least one hundred for the roads leading directly to the army of Northern Virginia. Similar organizations should be made for service further south and west.

A commission for the collection of railroad iron from unimportant lines, and distribution when necessary to those of vital consequence, as well as for the construction of iron plated gun-boats, has been organized by the joint action of the War and Navy Departments. Every possible impediment has been thrown in the way of this commission, and serious delays have been caused under the impressment act, by parties suing out injunctions, and resorting to other similar legal steps. In many cases, the iron rails must be had promptly as a military necessity, or disaster must follow. When this is established, the authority for removing them from less important roads should be given and enforced by the commanders of armies and departments, who are evidently the best prepared to judge and act. Orders from the War Department must be executed under the provisions of the law regulating impressments. Orders

from commanders under military necessity can be at once carried into effect.

4th. *Labor*—The greater part of the labor connected with the engineer operations has been performed by fatigue parties, by engineer troops, by a limited number of details for mechanical service, and by negroes hired and impressed; but from all these sources the supply has been inadequate. A better and more permanent organization of negro labor is demanded for military and civil engineer service, to the extent of about (29,000) twenty-nine thousand men (7,000 being for the Trans-Mississippi Department), not including those needed as teamsters and cooks for the workshops and other local service.

It has been made the duty of the bureau, by General Order No. 86, 1864, to organize all the slave labor called under act approved 17th February, 1864, for service with our armies, and officers have been appointed to attend to the same.

But up to this time the number of slaves impressed by conscript officers and delivered for organization is small, and I fear unless the impressments are made more rapidly than heretofore, that this labor, so essential, will not be available in time. The organization will be made as rapidly as the negroes are received.

There will be required a number of men, chiefly from the reserve forces, as directors, superintendents, managers and overseers, a part of whom will be considered as engaged in the engineer service.

In addition to the foregoing, the details of about (1,700) seventeen hundred able-bodied men (400 being for the Trans-Mississippi Department) is required. A large proportion of these necessary details has already been made by local commanders, and the men are constantly and fully employed.

It is hoped that the foregoing statement furnishes approximately, at least, the information desired.

I have the honor to be,

With great respect,

Your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,

Major-General and Chief of Bureau.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,

Surgeon-General's Office,

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA, February 9th, 1865.

Sir—In reply to the circular of the 7th instant, from your office, I have the honor to submit the following report:

By recent instructions, the Superintendent of Conscription has (on the authority of the War Department) directed that all disabled men detailed from the Army of Northern Virginia, should be returned for such duty as they may be able to perform in the field.

Objections cannot reasonably be made to this, provided the men not found equal to any duty in the field be returned to the same hospital from which they have been taken. But by Circular No. 35,

of December 2, 1864, from the Bureau of Conscription, generals of reserves are directed (on the authority of the War Department) to organize for certain local service "all men found for light duty and not otherwise assigned and actually employed," which deprives the Medical Department of the opportunity to replace with conscripts found for light duty the detailed men relieved in the manner above stated, or to fill the requirements arising from time to time for hospital attendants. The hospitals cannot be properly conducted without a liberal allowance of white male attendants, and it is recommended that Circular No. 35, of 1864, from the Bureau of Conscription, be modified so as to permit either conscripts found for light duty, or reserves over forty-five years of age, to be assigned as hospital attendants.

Under the authority of law (embodied in General Orders No. 69, of 1863, and No. 25, of 1864), soldiers sick or wounded, and likely to remain unfit for military duty for sixty days, are furloughed.

It is undoubtedly humane to furlough these men, but the practice is wholly inconsistent with preserving and maintaining an army. Many of the men are lost sight of, and never return. It is recommended that the law be repealed. Furloughs should only be authorized by orders to be granted as circumstances may demand.

Foreseeing the many and great difficulties to be encountered in procuring medical supplies from foreign countries through the blockade, attention was given at an early day to the establishment of medical laboratories, and the manufacture of medicines at Lincolnton, North Carolina, Charlotte, North Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, Macon and Atlanta, Georgia, and Mobile and Montgomery, Alabama. While these laboratories have been engaged more especially in the manufacture of medicines, heretofore universally procured from abroad, great attention has been given to the manufacture of indigenous remedies, which are now administered by medical officers, in lieu of medicines of foreign origin, with favorable results.

In the beginning of the war, the Department was compelled to depend entirely upon purchasing agents, and contracts awarded to individuals for a supply of hospital furniture, bedding, &c., and which contracts in a majority of cases were never filled. It was then determined to assume direct control of the manufacture of these articles, and artisans were detailed from the ranks of the army, and, when practicable, disabled soldiers were employed.

These employees of the laboratories, purveying depots and distilleries, are in a great measure expert chemists, druggists and distillers and men of professional skill, whose services are absolutely indispensable for the manufacture of medicines, hospital furniture and alcoholic stimulants. It is therefore hoped that the Honorable Secretary will see the necessity of these men being permanently attached to the Medical Department, as the practice of constantly changing these employees is productive of delay and embarrassment to the Department. It is also important that they should be

exempt from all military duty, for if called out in an emergency, when the Purveyor is called on to fill requisitions for the wounded, it is evident that suffering must ensue in consequence of their absence. Medical supplies can only be prepared and put up by skilled druggists.

For the supply of alcoholic stimulants, the Department has been until recently dependent upon contracts with individuals. It was ascertained that this mode of supply was susceptible of gross fraud, for although expressly forbidden by the terms of the contract, the contractors not only manufactured an excess over the quantity called for by the contract, but frequently manufactured so indifferent and spurious an article that the Department was obliged to reject it, thus leaving large quantities of whisky in their hands, which they readily disposed of at prices largely in advance of Government rates. At the suggestion of this bureau, Congress at its last session granted authority to the Surgeon-General to establish distilleries for the manufacture of alcoholic stimulants. Accordingly they have been established at Salisbury, North Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, Macon, Georgia, and in Wilcox county, Alabama. The distilleries at Salisbury and Columbia are manufacturing from two to five hundred gallons each of whisky and alcohol per day. Those at Macon and in Wilcox county, Alabama, will be ready to commence operations in two or three months, when all contracts for stimulants throughout the country will be cancelled.

A large portion of the grain consumed by these distilleries is rendered useless for other purposes, being damaged in transportation or from insecure storage, and turned over by the Quartermasters to this Department. Thousands of bushels of grain are thus saved to the Government and made available for army purposes. Arrangements have been perfected with the Quartermaster's Department to supply the distillery at Salisbury with grain, thus avoiding competition between the agents of the two Departments in the market. It is contemplated to make similar arrangements with the Quartermaster-General to supply the distilleries in Georgia and Alabama, so soon as they are ready to commence operations, and it is recommended that instructions be given that officer to furnish the necessary grain when notified by the Surgeon-General that he is ready to receive it.

The late Secretary of War gave orders to the Quartermaster's Department to furnish all the bureaux of the War Department with cotton goods sufficient to supply their wants. Estimates were accordingly forwarded to the Quartermaster-General by this bureau, but as yet not a yard has been furnished, and there seems to be no probability of obtaining a supply from this source. Arrangements are now being perfected with a company in South Carolina to sell to the Medical Department, on liberal terms, the entire product of their factory.

There is another subject of great importance, to which the atten-

tion of the Secretary of War is earnestly invited. The sick and wounded in the large hospitals in or about the city, and at certain other places, are now subjected to intense suffering, in consequence of the failure of the Quartermaster's Department to furnish fuel.

At one of these hospitals (Chimborazo) the surgeon in charge for two years furnished his own wood, during which time there was an ample supply. The Quartermaster declined to permit this arrangement to continue, and each winter since this hospital has been inadequately supplied.

The surgeon in charge of Jackson hospital has the offer of a contract for wood to be supplied the hospital; the Quartermaster refused to make the contract, stating that he had made ample provision. At Winder hospital the surgeon in charge during the past summer or fall offered, if he was provided with a small number of teams (two), to supply his own fuel; the Quartermaster refused, asserting that he could supply the hospital with the wood required. These cases are mentioned to show that the fuel could have been provided.

A serious difficulty in conducting the hospitals arises from the failure of the Commissary Department to furnish the hospital funds. Very general complaint has been made on this subject—one of importance, as without the hospital fund, it is impossible to supply the sick and wounded with the necessary supplies. The hospitals have also been embarrassed by the non-payment of the hospital attendants by the Quartermaster's Department.

Attention has been given recently to the importation of supplies through our lines on the Mississippi river, and the gulf border of Mississippi and Alabama. Cotton is exchanged for medical supplies, and in consequence of the recent disaster at Wilmington, it is believed that this trade will constitute the chief source of supply. This Department has obtained medicines in this manner through the energy of Surgeon Richard Potts, who has had exclusive control of the importation of such articles as are most needed, until recent orders from the War Department, taking entire control of transactions of this nature, has impaired his usefulness, and put a stop in a measure to the supply. The Honorable Secretary's attention is earnestly invited to the necessity of allowing Surgeon Potts (located at Montgomery, Alabama), ample means for obtaining medical supplies in the manner indicated.

The department has on hand, of some articles, a twelve months' supply, of others a limited supply, but if allowed to retain its skilled employees at the various laboratories, purveying depots and distilleries, and to import medicines freely through our lines in Mississippi and Alabama, no fear need be entertained that the sick and wounded of the army will suffer for the want of any of the essential articles of the supply table.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. MOORE,

Surgeon-General C. S. A.

Hon. JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE, *Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.*

Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life in the Army of Northern Virginia.

By CARLTON MCCARTHY,

Private of Second Company Richmond Howitzers, Cutshaw's Battalion.

[Many of our "boys who wore the gray" will be glad to see these vivid pictures of what they experienced, and many others will rejoice to have these details of soldier life. And these "minutiae" are by no means beneath the notice of the grave historians who would know and tell the whole truth concerning our grand old army.]

PAPER No. 1.—*The Outfit Modified.*

With the men who composed the Army of Northern Virginia will die the memory of those little things which made the Confederate soldier peculiarly what he was.

The historian who essays to write the "grand movements" will hardly stop to tell how the hungry private fried his bacon, baked his biscuit and smoked his pipe; how he was changed from time to time by the necessities of the service, until the gentleman, the student, the merchant, the mechanic and the farmer were merged into a perfect, all-enduring, never-tiring and invincible soldier. To preserve these little details, familiar to all soldiers, and by them not thought worthy of mention to others, because of their familiarity, but still dear to them and always the substance of their "war talks," is the object of this paper.

The volunteer of 1861 made extensive preparations for the field. Boots, he thought, were an absolute necessity, and the heavier the soles and longer the tops the better. His pants were stuffed inside the tops of his boots, of course. A double-breasted coat, heavily wadded, with two rows of big brass buttons and a long skirt, was considered comfortable. A small stiff cap, with a narrow brim, took the place of the comfortable "felt" or the shining and towering tile worn in civil life.

Then over all was a huge overcoat, long and heavy, with a cape reaching nearly to the waist. On his back he strapped a knapsack containing a full stock of underwear, soap, towels, comb, brush, looking-glass, tooth-brush, paper and envelopes, pens, ink, pencils, blacking, photographs, smoking and chewing tobacco, pipes, twine string and cotton strips for wounds and other emergencies, needles and thread, buttons, knife, fork and spoon, and many other things as each man's idea of what he was to encounter varied. On the outside of the knapsack, solidly folded, were two great blankets and

a rubber or oilcloth. This knapsack, &c., weighed from fifteen to twenty-five pounds, and sometimes even more. All seemed to think it was impossible to have on too many or too heavy clothes, or to have too many conveniences, and each had an idea that to be a good soldier he must be provided against every possible emergency.

In addition to the knapsack, each man had a haversack, more or less costly, some of cloth and some of fine morocco, and stored with provisions always, as though he expected any moment to receive orders to march across the great desert, and supply his own wants on the way. A canteen was thought indispensable, and at the outset it was thought very prudent to keep it full of water. Many, expecting terrific hand to hand encounters, carried revolvers, and even bowie-knives.

Merino shirts (and flannel) were thought to be the right thing, but experience demonstrated the contrary.

In addition to each man's private luggage, each mess, generally composed of from five to ten men who were drawn together by similar tastes and associations, had *its* outfit, consisting of a large camp chest containing skillet, frying pan, coffee boiler, bucket for lard, coffee box, salt box, sugar box, meal box, flour box, knives, forks, spoons, plates, cups, &c., &c. These chests were so large that 8 or 10 of them filled up an army wagon, and were so heavy that two strong men had all they could do to get one of them into the wagon. In addition to the chest each mess owned an axe, water bucket, and bread tray. Then the tents of each company, and little sheet-iron stoves, and stove pipe, and the trunks and valises of the company officers, made an immense pile of stuff, so that each company had a small wagon train of its own.

All thought money was absolutely necessary, and for awhile rations were disdained, and the mess supplied with the best that could be bought with the mess fund. Gloves were thought to be good things to have in winter time, and the favorite style was buck gauntlets with long cuffs.

Quite a large number had a "boy" along to do the cooking and washing. Think of it? A Confederate soldier with a body servant all his own, to bring him a drink of water, black his boots, dust his clothes, cook his corn bread and bacon, and put wood on his fire. Never was there fonder admiration than these darkies displayed for their masters.

Their chief delight and glory was to praise the courage and good looks of "Mahse Tom," and prophesy great things about his future.

Many a ringing laugh and shout of fun originated in the queer remarks, shining countenance and glistening teeth of this now forever departed character.

It is amusing to think of the follies of the early part of the war, as illustrated by the outfits of the volunteers. They were so heavily clad, and so burdened with all manner of things, that a march was torture, and the wagon trains were so immense in proportion to the number of troops, that it would have been impossible to guard them in an enemy's country. Subordinate officers thought themselves entitled to transportation for trunks and even mattresses and folding bedsteads, and the privates were as ridiculous in their demands.

This much by way of introduction. The change came rapidly and stayed not until the transformation was complete. Nor was the change attributable alone to the orders of the general officers. The men soon learned the inconvenience and danger of so much luggage, and as they became more experienced, vied with each other in reducing themselves to light marching trim.

Experience soon demonstrated that boots were not agreeable on a long march. They were heavy and irksome, and when the heels were worn a little onesided, the wearer would find his ankle twisted nearly out of joint by every unevenness of the road. When thoroughly wet, it was a laborious undertaking to get them off, and worse to get them on in time to answer the morning roll-call. And so good, strong, broad-bottomed and big flat heeled brogues or brogans succeeded the boots, and were found much more comfortable and agreeable, easier put on and off, and altogether the most sensible.

A short waisted, single breasted jacket usurped the place of the long tail coat, and became universal. The enemy noticed this peculiarity, and called the Confederates gray jackets, which name was immediately transferred to those lively creatures, which were the constant admirers and inseparable companions of the Boys in Gray and Blue.

Caps were destined to hold out longer than some other uncomfortable things, but they finally yielded to the demands of comfort and common sense, and a good soft felt hat was worn instead. A man who has never been a soldier does not know, nor indeed can know, the amount of comfort there is in a good soft hat in camp, and now utterly useless is a "soldier hat" as they are generally made. Why the Prussians, with all their experience,

wear their heavy, unyielding helmets, and the French their little caps, is a mystery to a Confederate who has enjoyed the comfort of an old slouch.

Overcoats an inexperienced man would think an absolute necessity for men exposed to the rigors of a Northern Virginia winter, but they grew scarcer and scarcer. They were found a great inconvenience and burden. The men came to the conclusion that the trouble of carrying them hot days outweighed the comfort of having them when the cold day arrived. Besides they found that life in the open air hardened them to such an extent, that the changes in the temperature were not felt to any degree. Some clung to their overcoats to the last, but the majority got tired lugging them around, and either discarded them altogether, or trusted to capturing one about the time it would be needed. Nearly every overcoat in the army in the latter years was one of Uncle Sam's, captured from his boys.

The knapsack vanished early in the struggle. It was found that it was inconvenient to "change" the underwear too often, and the disposition not to change grew, as the knapsack was found to gall the back and shoulders, and weary the man before half the march was accomplished. It was found that the better way was to dress out and out, and wear that outfit until the enemy's knapsacks or the folks at home supplied a change. Certainly it did not pay to carry around clean clothes while waiting for the time to use them.

Very little washing was done, as a matter of course. Clothes once given up were parted with forever. There were good reasons for this. Cold water would not cleanse them or destroy the vermin, and hot water was not always to be had. One blanket to each man was found to be as much as could be carried, and amply sufficient for the severest weather. This was carried generally by rolling it lengthwise, with the rubber cloth outside, tying the ends of the roll together, and throwing the loop thus made over the left shoulder with the ends fastened together hanging under the right arm.

The haversack held its own to the last, and was found practical and useful. It very seldom, however, contained rations, but was used to carry all the articles generally carried in the knapsack; of course the stock was small. Somehow or other, many men managed to do without the haversack, and carried absolutely nothing but what they wore and had in their pockets. The infantry threw away their heavy cap-boxes and cartridge-boxes, and carried

their caps and cartridges in their pockets. Canteens were very useful at times, but they were as a general thing discarded. They were not much used to carry water, but were found useful when the men were driven to the necessity of foraging, for conveying buttermilk, cider, sorghum, &c., to camp. A good strong tin cup was found better than a canteen, as it was easier to fill at a well or spring, and was serviceable as a boiler for making coffee when the column halted for the night.

Revolvers were found to be about as useless and heavy lumber as a private soldier could carry, and early in the war were sent home to be used by the women and children in protecting themselves from insult and violence at the hands of the ruffians who prowled about the country shirking duty.

Strong cotton was adopted in place of flannel and merino, for two reasons. First, because easier to wash, and second, because the vermin did not propagate so rapidly in cotton as in wool.

Common white cotton shirts and drawers proved the best that could be used by the private soldier.

Gloves to any but a mounted man were found useless, worse than useless. With the gloves on, it was impossible to handle an axe well, or buckle harness, or load a musket, or handle a rammer at the piece. Wearing them was found to be simply a habit, and so, on the principle that the less luggage the less labor, *they* were discarded.

The camp-chest soon vanished. The Brigadiers and Major-Generals even found them too troublesome, and soon they were left entirely to the quartermasters and commissaries. One skillet and a couple of frying pans, a bag for flour or meal, another bag for salt, sugar and coffee, divided by a knot tied between, served the purpose as well. The skillet passed from mess to mess. Each mess generally owned a frying pan, but often one served a company.

The oilcloth was found to be as good as the wooden tray for making up the dough. The water bucket held its own to the last!

Tents were *rarely seen*. All the poetry about the "*tented field*" died. Two men slept together, each had a blanket and an oilcloth. One oilcloth went next to the ground. The two laid on this, covered themselves with two blankets, protected from the rain with the second oilcloth on top, and slept very comfortably through rain, snow or hail, as it might be.

Very little money was seen in camp. The men did not expect, did not care for, or get often any pay, and they were not willing to

deprive the old folks at home of their little supply ; so they learned to do without any money.

When rations got short and were getting shorter, it became necessary to dismiss the darkey servants. Some, however, became company servants, instead of private institutons, and held out faithfully to the end, cooking the rations away in the rear, and at the risk of life carrying them to the line of battle to be devoured with voracity by their "young mahsters."

Reduced to the minimum, the private soldier consisted of one man, one hat, one jacket, one shirt, one pair of pants, one pair of drawers, one pair of shoes, and one pair of socks. His baggage was one blanket, one rubber blanket, and one haversack. The haversack generally contained smoking tobacco and a pipe and generally a small piece of soap, with temporary additions of apples, persimmons, blackberries, and such other commodities as he could pick up on the march.

The company property consisted of two or three skillets and frying pans, which were sometimes carried in the wagon, but oftener in the hands of the soldiers. The infantrymen generally preferred to stick the handle of the frying pan in the barrel of a musket, and so carry it.

The wagon trains were devoted entirely to the transportation of ammunition and commissary and quartermaster's stores, which had not been issued. Rations which had become company property, and the baggage of the men, when they had any, was carried by the men themselves. If, as was sometimes the case, three days' rations were issued at one time and the troops ordered to cook them, and be prepared to march, they did cook them, *and eat them if possible*, so as to avoid the labor of carrying them. It was not such an undertaking either, to eat three days' rations in one, as frequently none had been issued for more than a day, and when issued were cut down one-half.

The infantry found out that bayonets were not of much use, and did not hesitate to throw them, with the scabbard, away.

The artillerymen, who started out with heavy sabers hanging to their belts, stuck them up in the mud as they marched, and left them for the ordinance officers to pick up and turn over to the cavalry.

The cavalrymen found sabres very tiresome when swung to the belt, and adopted the plan of fastening them to the saddle on the left side, with the hilt in front and in reach of the hand. Finally

sabres got very scarce even among the cavalrymen, who relied more and more on their short rifles.

No soldiers ever marched with less to encumber them, and none marched faster or held out longer.

The courage and devotion of the men rose equal to every hardship and privation, and the very intensity of their sufferings became a source of merriment. Instead of growling and deserting, they laughed at their own bare feet, ragged clothes and pinched faces, and weak, hungry, cold, wet, worried with vermin and itch, dirty, with no hope of reward or rest, but each fighting on his own personal account, needing not the voice of any to urge them on, marched cheerfully to meet the well fed and warmly clad hosts of the enemy.

General R. E. Rodes' Report of the Battle of Gettysburg.

[General R. E. Lee's, General Longstreet's, General Ewell's and General Early's reports of the Gettysburg campaign have been published, together with General J. E. B. Stuart's report of those stirring and important movements which preceded and which followed the great battle.

We are indebted to the courteous kindness of Mrs. Rodes for the MS. of the original report of Major-General R. E. Rodes, whose division bore so important a part in that campaign. We are sure that many inquirers after the truth of history will thank us for giving (for the first time) to the world this report of the accomplished soldier, whose gallantry and skill won for him so high a reputation, and whose death on the field at Winchester was lamented as a sad loss to the army, and to the Confederacy.

We hope hereafter to publish others of the more important reports of this great campaign.]

REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS RODES' DIVISION, ORANGE C. H., 1863.

Lt. Col. A. S. PENDLETON, A. A. General Second Army Corps :

Colonel—In compliance with orders, I have the honor herewith to submit a report of the operations of this division during the period which elapsed from the breaking up of camp at Grace church, in Caroline county, to its return to the Rappahannock waters.

During this period the division was organized as follows: Daniel's North Carolina brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Junius Daniel, composed of the following regiments: Thirty-second North

Carolina, commanded by Colonel E. C. Brabble; Forty-third North Carolina, commanded by Colonel Thomas S. Keenan; Forty-fifth North Carolina, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel H. Boyd; Fifty-third North Carolina, commanded by Colonel W. A. Owens, and Second North Carolina battalion, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Andrews;—Doles' Georgia brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General George Doles, composed of the Fourth Georgia, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel D. R. E. Winn; Twelfth Georgia, commanded by Colonel Edward Willis; Twenty-first Georgia, commanded by Colonel John T. Mercer, and Forty-fourth Georgia, commanded by Colonel S. P. Lumpkin;—Iverson's North Carolina brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General Alfred Iverson, composed of the Fifth North Carolina, commanded by Captain S. B. West; Twelfth North Carolina, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Davis; Twentieth North Carolina, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Slough, and Twenty-third North Carolina, commanded by Colonel D. H. Christie;—Ramseur's North Carolina brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General S. D. Ramseur, composed of the Second North Carolina, commanded by Major E. W. Hurt; Fourth North Carolina, commanded by Colonel Bryan Grimes; Fourteenth North Carolina, commanded by Colonel R. T. Bennett, and Thirtieth North Carolina, commanded by Colonel F. M. Parker;—Rodes' Alabama brigade, commanded by Colonel E. A. O'Neal, composed of Third Alabama, commanded by Colonel C. A. Battle; Fifth Alabama, commanded by Colonel J. M. Hall; Sixth Alabama, commanded by Colonel J. N. Lightfoot; Twelfth Alabama, commanded by Colonel S. B. Pickens, and Twenty-sixth Alabama, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Goodgame; and Lieutenant-Colonel Thos. H. Carter's battalion of sixteen pieces of artillery, composed of Carter's, Page's, Fry's and Reese's batteries.

Receiving orders to march on the 3d of June, the division was put in motion early on the morning of the 4th, and after marching some sixteen miles, bivouacked two miles north of Spotsylvania courthouse. Next day, after a march of twenty-one miles, turning to the right at Verdiersville, in order to cross the Rapidan at Raccoon or Sommerville ford, we bivouacked near Old Verdiersville. After marching about four miles on the 6th, I received orders "to halt and wait further orders." Resuming the march on the 7th, we crossed the Rapidan at Sommerville ford, passed through Culpeper courthouse, and bivouacked four miles beyond, on the Rixeyville road, having marched about nineteen miles.

On the 8th, finding that a long march was ahead of us, and that the supplies had to be closely looked to, I ordered all the baggage, tents, &c., that could be spared to be sent to the rear. By this means each brigade was enabled to transport three days' rations in its train, in addition to an equal amount in the division commissary train, the men also carrying three days' rations each in his haversack. Hence, when the division resumed its march, it was supplied with full nine days' rations.

On the 9th, anticipating an order to do so, I moved the division towards Brandy Station to the support of General Stuart's cavalry. Halting, under Lieutenant-General Ewell's orders, at Botts' place, I subsequently, under orders, advanced to Barbour's house in advance of the station, but did not get in reach of the enemy, he having apparently been repulsed by the cavalry. Resumed the road, under orders, and after a ten-mile march bivouacked on Hazel river, near Gourd Vine church. Next day the route was resumed at an early hour, and on, without exception, the worst road I have ever seen troops and trains pass over. The route designated for the division led by Newby's X roads to Washington, but finding the portion of the road between these two points absolutely impracticable, and the men and horses well nigh exhausted by the severe march to Newby's X roads, I was compelled to proceed by Gaines' X roads. Before taking that route, however, I found that the movements of the division were not likely to be discovered by the enemy, and hence that there was no necessity for taking the more tortuous and difficult road by Washington. The route via Gaines' X roads to Flint Hill being a good one, we reached the latter place early in the afternoon, and halted an hour or more to await the passage of Early's division, which I knew was to precede mine, and which was to have entered the turnpike upon which I was marching at Flint Hill. Ascertaining that General Early had been compelled to abandon his prescribed line of march, by reason of the impracticable character of the Fodderstack road, and acting under orders from Lieutenant-General Ewell, I resumed the march, and bivouacked about one and a half miles north of Flint Hill, having marched about fifteen miles.

On the 12th of June, having received orders to proceed in advance of the other divisions of the corps, my command crossed the Blue Ridge, through Chester Gap, passed through Front Royal, forded both forks of the Shenandoah river, and halted for a few hours near Cedarville. Here the Lieutenant-General fully unfolded his

immediate plan of action to me, which was in brief as follows, orders being given me to proceed at once, and in accordance with this plan to the execution of my part of it:

The main features of the plan were the simultaneous attack of Winchester and Berryville; the subsequent attack of Martinsburg, and the immediate entrance into Maryland, via Williamsport, or any other point near there which events indicated as best. My division was ordered to take the Berryville road via Millwood, to attack and seize Berryville, then to advance without delay on Martinsburg, and thence proceed to Maryland, there to await further orders; this while the two other divisions of the corps reduced Winchester. To enable me to carry out this plan the better, and to obtain full supplies of fresh meat, &c., as soon as possible after crossing the Potomac, and for other purposes not necessary to mention, the cavalry brigade of General A. G. Jenkins, of about 1,600 men, which had just joined the column, was placed under my command.

In obedience to my instructions, the division was at once moved directly from Cedarville towards Millwood, by an unfrequented road, under the guidance of Mr. John McCormack, a most excellent guide and soldier. To conceal the movements of the infantry, the cavalry were ordered to take the road by Nineveh church and White Post, and a part of it to proceed to Millwood. After a march of seventeen miles, the division bivouacked near Stone bridge.

BERRYVILLE.

On the 13th, we moved on towards Berryville, but before reaching Millwood, the advance of the infantry was discovered by some of the enemy's cavalry, who had come up from Berry's ferry (apparently en route to Berryville), a result which would have been avoided had General Jenkins occupied Millwood during the night before, as he was ordered to do. Finding our movements discovered, the division was marched, with the utmost celerity, through Millwood, upon Berryville, where Jenkin's brigade, after driving in the enemy's cavalry, was found, held at bay by the Federal artillery. Arriving on the field, and communicating with General Jenkins, it was apparent that the enemy were preparing to evacuate the place, but still held it, as well as I could judge, with infantry, cavalry and artillery. I immediately determined to surround them if possible, and ordered General Jenkins to march to the left of the town, to cut off the retreat of the enemy towards Winchester. The infantry,

save one brigade, without being halted, were ordered to move to the right and left of the place to unite in its rear. These movements were begun and executed under cover, but before their execution was much advanced, it became apparent to me that the enemy was retreating, and I ordered the Alabama brigade, Colonel O'Neal commanding, to advance rapidly upon the town; which was done. I was mortified to learn that the enemy, abandoning his tents, a few stores, &c., had left his cavalry and artillery to keep our cavalry in check, and had some time before retreated with his infantry towards Charlestown, without being discovered. I found that the approaches to the town were well defended by rifle pits and earthworks for guns, and that with an adequate force it was capable of being strongly defended. It had, however, been held by a force too small to admit of a successful defence against my command. The enemy's force there consisted of two small regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery of rifle guns, in all about 1,800 men, under the command of Colonel McReynolds. Neither my troops nor General Jenkins' cavalry suffered any loss, the enemy firing only a few rounds of artillery after my arrival. A portion of General Jenkins' men had been skirmishing during the afternoon of the previous day, and on the morning of the 13th, and had lost a few men, among them Lieutenant Charles Norvell, who was wounded and captured in a gallant charge upon the enemy near Nineveh.

After securing such stores as were at all valuable, the division was again put in motion towards Martinsburg. General Jenkins had already proceeded in pursuit of the enemy, by a road west of Berryville. One portion of his command, under my orders, pursued him by the Charlestown road. Just before reaching the road to Summit Point, I was informed by an officer of cavalry that the enemy pursued that route, and later that he had gone towards Winchester. I followed him to Summit Point, where we bivouacked, after having marched about twenty miles, not including the wide detours made at Berryville by the brigades of Daniel, Doles, Ramseur and Iverson, in the effort to surround the enemy.

Major Sweeny's battalion, of Jenkins' brigade, which had been put in pursuit of the enemy under my direct orders, overtook his rear guard near the Opequon creek, and made a most gallant charge upon it, capturing a piece of artillery, which they were unable to hold, the enemy being too strong for them. Major Sweeny, who acted very gallantly in this affair, was very badly wounded in the

charge. In the absence of any official report from General Jenkins, I cannot explain why he did not intercept a portion, at least, of the enemy's force. It seems, however, clear that before the close of the day, the General made a fierce attack upon a detachment of cavalry and infantry at Bunker Hill, losing several men in a gallant attack upon a party of the latter, who had thrown themselves into two stone houses, well provided for defence, with loop-holes and barricades fixed for that purpose. He captured here about seventy-five or one hundred prisoners, and drove the balance towards Martinsburg. These facts I learned on the next day.

On the morning of the 14th it was apparent that during the night the enemy had continued his march to Winchester, whither I ordered the only force of cavalry I could then communicate with—Sweeny's battalion—to follow and annoy him. Not having heard anything from Winchester, though I had dispatched several couriers to the Lieutenant-General commanding, I hesitated for a few moments between proceeding towards Martinsburg, in accordance with my general instructions, and turning towards Winchester. The reflection that should my division be needed there, I would that day receive orders to turn back, determined me to push on to Martinsburg as rapidly as possible, which I did, reaching that place late in the afternoon, after a very fatiguing march of nineteen miles.

MARTINSBURG.

Arriving in the field before Martinsburg, ahead of the troops, I found General Jenkins, with his command, before the enemy, skirmishing with him occasionally. The enemy's forces were drawn up in line of battle on the right of the town, exhibiting infantry, cavalry and artillery. General Jenkins, through Captain Harris, of my staff, had summoned the Federal commander to surrender, which he declined doing.

Before the infantry came up I ordered General Jenkins to move most of his force to the left of the town; to dismount it, and send it forward as skirmishers; to endeavor to get possession of the town, thus cutting off the enemy's retreat towards Hedgesville and Williamsport, and to report to me what force, if any, he discovered in and to the left of the town. At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Carter was directed to take the best position for his artillery, to enable him to silence the opposing battery, which was annoying us. Without halting, the infantry was put in a position for a direct attack, the Alabama brigade on the right supporting the artillery,

which had already opened; Ramseur on the left, Doles and Iverson in the centre, Daniel in reserve. Before these preparations had been completed, however, the enemy's battery had been nearly silenced; and fearing he would retreat, I ordered Ramseur's brigade, and each of the others in turn, to advance with speed upon the enemy's position.

Notwithstanding their fatiguing march, the troops exhibited great enthusiasm, and rapidly occupied the town and the enemy's position. Ramseur's brigade, being in the lead, pursued the enemy at almost a run for two miles beyond the town, but quick as it was, the dismounted cavalry and a squadron or two on horseback, under General Jenkins, were ahead of them, and after a few shots, compelled the enemy to abandon all his guns, with perhaps one exception. Five of his pieces, with their caissons and most of their horses, were thus captured. Nothing was seen of the Federal infantry after the attack began, nor was it known, for some hours after their retreat, that it escaped by the Shepherdstown road, whilst the cavalry and artillery fled by way of Williamsport. This latter fact, together with the darkness, prevented the cavalry from discovering that the force had divided. Could the division have reached the town an hour or two earlier, thus giving me time to seize the principal roads leading into Martinsburg, I feel certain that I would have captured the whole force. Under the circumstances, however, nothing was proper except a direct attack, as to have awaited daylight would have lost to us all the artillery and the stores, which we secured by moving ahead without delay. General Jenkins continued the pursuit of the enemy that night nearly to the river, capturing many prisoners. Many others were taken in town by the infantry. The enemy endeavored to burn the stores accumulated at Martinsburg, and to a large extent succeeded in doing so, but left in our hands some 6,000 bushels of fine grain, some commissary stores, about 400 rounds of rifled artillery ammunition, and small arms and ammunition in small quantity. With the artillery were captured two excellent ambulances.

After recalling Ramseur from the pursuit, and putting a regiment of Doles' brigade in that town as a guard, the appropriate officers were set to work gathering prisoners who were concealed in the houses of many of the Union families of the town, and taking inventories of the supplies.

On the 15th, the troops were allowed to rest until after 10 A. M., when for the first time I received information as to the progress of

events at Winchester, and about the same time learned that General Milroy, with his shattered command, had passed Smithfield en route for Harper's Ferry, and had already gotten out of my reach. General Jenkins' gallant brigade, under his impetuous leadership, had already succeeded in crossing the Potomac above Williamsport, and after driving off the small force at that place, had advanced into Pennsylvania. Leaving Colonel Lightfoot with his regiment, the Sixth Alabama, as a guard at Martinsburg, and ordering the pioneers of the division to continue, during that day and the next, the destruction of the railroad, I put the division in motion for Williamsport, and arrived there by dark, after the most trying march we had yet had—most trying because of the intense heat, the character of the road, and the increased number of barefooted men in the command. Three brigades, Ramseur's, Iverson's and Doles', with three batteries of artillery, were ordered across the Potomac at once. It was not until this day that the troops began to exhibit unmistakable signs of exhaustion, and that stragglers could be found in the line of march, and even then none but absolutely worn out men fell out of line. The whole march from Culpeper courthouse to Williamsport, which was an extremely rapid one, was executed in a manner highly creditable to the officers and men of the division.

A halt at Williamsport was absolutely necessary, from the condition of the feet of the unshod men. Very many of these gallant fellows were still marching in ranks with feet bruised, bleeding and swollen, and withal so cheerfully, as to entitle them to be called the heroes of the Pennsylvania campaign. None but the best of soldiers could have made such a march under such circumstances.

As soon as possible after arriving at Williamsport, a strong guard was placed over it, and the necessary instructions were given to General Jenkins about obtaining supplies of cattle and horses. In obedience to orders, the command remained at Williamsport during the 16th, 17th and 18th, in which time, with the aid of General Jenkins' cavalry, the commissaries and quartermasters obtained, in a proper manner, large supplies in their respective departments. The pioneers, under Captain Chichester, were busy during our rest here trying to destroy the aqueduct over the Conococheague. Some 5,000 pounds of leather were bought by Major Paxton at Williamsport and sent to the rear. At Hagerstown and Williamsport thirty-five kegs of powder were purchased and sent back.

I may as well mention here that at Williamsport, Hagerstown, Chambersburg, &c., large quantities of such articles as were suitable for Government use were obtained by purchase, or certificate, and sent back by Quartermasters Paxton, Rogers and Harman. During the march into Pennsylvania some two or three thousand (2,000 or 3,000) head of cattle were taken, and either appropriated for the command, or sent to the rear for the other divisions. Some 1,200 or 1,500 were thus sent back. The horses were almost all seized by the cavalry of General Jenkins, and were rarely accounted for. My best efforts were made to suppress all irregularities, and being very generally and cheerfully seconded by officers and men, they succeeded satisfactorily. Some few cases of fraud, and some (at Greencastle) of violence to property—the latter traceable to the cavalry—were heard of. A few instances of forced purchases were reported, but never established. I believe that one quartermaster seized such articles as velvet, &c., but I could not find him out. In all cases of purchase that came before me the parties were fully paid and satisfied.

On the 17th or 18th the Lieutenant-General commanding visited my quarters, and gave me additional instructions, to the effect that the division should, on the 19th, resume its march, and move slowly towards Chambersburg, until the division of General Johnson had crossed the Potomac. Accordingly on the 19th it was put in motion, and proceeded to Hagerstown, where, in obedience to further instructions, its march was directed towards Boonsboro', as if threatening Harper's Ferry, and halted about two miles from Hagerstown on the Boonsboro' road. Remaining two days near Hagerstown—during which period I received further verbal instructions in a personal interview with Lieutenant-General Ewell—on the 22d the division resumed its march, and on that day penetrated into the enemy's country. Iverson's brigade was the first to touch Pennsylvania soil. After a march of thirteen miles we bivouacked at Greencastle. During the night, under orders, I reported in person at the headquarters of the Lieutenant-General commanding—then at Beaver Creek, between Boonsboro' and Hagerstown—and after an interview with him and General Early, rejoined my command next day, Lieutenant-General Ewell accompanying me.

General Jenkins had, in the mean time, advanced to Chambersburg, where he was ordered to remain until my division came up, which he failed to do, because of the reported approach of the

enemy in strong force. The result was that most of the property in that place which would have been of service to the troops, such as boots, hats, leather, &c., were removed or concealed before it was reoccupied. From this date General Jenkins was directly under the orders of the Lieutenant-General in effect, as the latter was thenceforth constantly with the advance guard of infantry.

At Greencastle the orders of General Lee regulating the conduct of troops and officers of all departments whilst in the enemy's country were received, but they had, in substance, been anticipated by orders, first from division and then from corps headquarters. The conduct of the troops of this division was entirely in accordance with those orders, and challenged the admiration of their commanding officers, whilst it astonished the people along the line of march. These latter, very generally, expected to be treated by us with the wanton cruelty generally exhibited by their troops when they are upon our soil. As a general rule, they apparently expected to see their houses burned down, and all their property carried off or destroyed.

From the 23d of June the movements of my command were executed under the immediate supervision of the commander of the corps.

Resuming its march on the 24th, the division made fourteen miles, passing through Chambersburg, which had been reoccupied by General Jenkins that morning, and bivouacked on the Conococheague, two and a half miles beyond the town. The Third Alabama regiment, Colonel Battle commanding, was left in the town as a guard for the people, property, &c.

At Chambersburg the division of General Johnson joined mine, and the two, moving on slowly without noteworthy incident, reached Carlisle on the 27th. The brigades of Daniel, Iverson and Ramseur occupied the United States barracks at this place, that of General Doles bivouacked on the campus of Dickinson College, a portion of his force acting as guard for the town, while the Alabama brigade bivouacked on and picketed the Baltimore turnpike, one and a half miles from town. Large supplies of cattle, horses and flour were obtained here and on the march, and in the barracks stables a large quantity of grain was found. Most of the Government property, except the grain, had been removed by the enemy, but musketballs, holsters, tents, and a small quantity of subsistence stores were found in the barracks.

Jenkins' cavalry, on our arrival at Carlisle, advanced towards

Harrisburg, and had, on the 29th, made a thorough reconnoissance of the defences of the place, with a view to our advance upon it—a step which every man in the division contemplated with eagerness, and which was to have been executed on the 30th—but on the 30th, having received orders to move towards the balance of the army, then supposed to be at or near Cashtown, we set out for that place, marching through Petersburg, and bivouacking at Heidlersburg after a march of at least twenty-two miles.

GETTYSBURG.

On the 1st of July, in pursuance of the order to rejoin the army, the division resumed its march, but upon arriving at Middletown, and hearing that Lieutenant-General Hill's corps was moving upon Gettysburg, by order of General Ewell the head of the column was turned in that direction. When within four miles of the town, to my surprise, the presence of the enemy there in force was announced by the sound of a sharp cannonade, and instant preparations for battle were made. On arriving on the field, I found that by keeping along the wooded ridge on the left side of which the town of Gettysburg is situated, I could strike the force of the enemy, with which General Hill's troops were engaged, upon the flank, and that, besides moving under cover, whenever we struck the enemy, we could engage him with the advantage in ground. The division was therefore moved along the summit of the ridge with only one brigade deployed at first, and finally—as the enemy's cavalry had discovered us, and the ground was of such character as to admit of cover for a large opposing force—with three brigades deployed; Doles on the left, "Rodes' old brigade," Colonel O'Neal commanding, in the centre, and Iverson on the right. The artillery and the two other brigades moved up closely to the line of battle. The division had to move nearly a mile before coming in view of the enemy's forces, except a few mounted men, and finally arrived at a point, a prominent hill on the ridge, whence the whole of that portion of the force opposing General Hill's troops could be seen. To get at these troops properly, which were still over half a mile from us, it was necessary to move the whole of my command by the right flank, and to change direction to the right. Whilst this was being done, Carter's battalion was ordered forward, and soon opened fire upon the enemy, who at this moment, as far as I could see, had no troops facing me at all. He had apparently been surprised—only a desultory fire of artillery was going on between his troops and

General Hill's—but before my dispositions were made, the enemy began to show large bodies of men in front of the town, most of which were directed upon the position which I held, and almost at the same time a portion of the force opposed to General Hill changed position so as to occupy the woods on the summit of the same ridge I occupied (I refer to the forest touching the railroad, and extending along the summit of the ridge towards my position, as far as the Mummasburg road, which crossed the ridge at the base of the hill I held). Either these last troops, or others which had hitherto been unobserved behind the same body of woods, soon made their appearance directly opposite my centre. Being thus threatened from two directions, I determined to attack with my centre and right, holding at bay still another force, then emerging from the town (apparently with the intention of turning my left), with Doles' brigade, which was moved somewhat to the left for this purpose, and trusting to this gallant brigade thus holding them until General Early's division arrived, which I knew would be soon, and which would strike this portion of the enemy's force on the flank before it could overpower Doles. At this moment Doles' brigade occupied the open plain between the Middletown road and the foot of the ridge before spoken of. The Alabama brigade, with a wide interval between it and Doles, extended from this plain up the slope of the ridge and over its summit. Iverson's brigade extended from the summit down the western or right slope of the ridge. Daniel's brigade supported Iverson's, and extended some distance to the right of it. Ramseur was in reserve. All the troops were in the woods except Doles' and a portion of "Rodes'" (O'Neal's) brigade, but all were subjected to some loss or annoyance from the enemy's artillery.

Whilst making some examination into the position and apparent intentions of the enemy, with the view of attacking him, this artillery fire became so annoying that I ordered the Alabama brigade to fall back from the line it had occupied, abreast with Iverson, so as to obtain some little shelter for the troops. The right regiment, Third Alabama, was under my order placed on a line with Daniel's brigade, Colonel O'Neal being instructed to form the balance of the brigade upon it. These dispositions were but temporary and unimportant, and are mentioned only because they are necessary to a full understanding of Colonel O'Neal's report.

Finding that the enemy was rash enough to come out from the woods to attack me, I determined to meet him when he got to the

foot of the hill I occupied, and as he did so, I caused Iverson's brigade to advance, and at the same moment gave in person to O'Neal the order to attack, indicating to him precisely the point to which he was to direct the left of the four regiments then under his orders; the Fifth Alabama, which formed the extreme left of this brigade, being held in reserve, under my own immediate command, to defend the gap between O'Neal and Doles. Daniel was at the same moment instructed to advance to support Iverson, if necessary, if not, to attack on his right as soon as possible. Carter's whole battalion was by this time engaged hotly, a portion from the right, the remainder from the left of the hill, and was subjected to a heavy artillery fire in return.

Iverson's brigade attacked handsomely, but suffered very heavily from the enemy's musketry fire from behind a stone wall along the crest of the ridge. The Alabama brigade went into action in some confusion, and with only three of its regiments, the Sixth, Twelfth and Twenty-sixth, the Fifth having been retained by my order, and for reasons explained to Colonel O'Neal, the Third having been permitted by Colonel O'Neal to move with Daniel's brigade. The three first mentioned regiments moved with alacrity (but not in accordance with my orders as to direction) and in confusion, into the action. It was soon apparent that they were making no impression upon the enemy, and hence I ordered forward the Fifth Alabama to their support, but, to my surprise in giving this command to its colonel, Hall, I found that Colonel O'Neal, instead of personally superintending the movements of his brigade, had chosen to remain with this reserve regiment. The result was that the whole brigade, with the exception of the Third Alabama, the movements of which will be seen by reference to the reports of Generals Ramseur and Iverson, and Colonel Battle, was repulsed quickly, and with loss. (Upon investigation recently, I find that just as O'Neal's men were about starting, and upon his informing me that he and his staff officers were not mounted, and that he had no mounted men with him, I permitted him to send Lieutenant Arrington, of my staff, to Colonel Battle, commanding the Third Alabama regiment, with his orders, and that Lieutenant Arrington delivered them to Colonel Battle).

Iverson's left being exposed thus, heavy loss was inflicted upon his brigade. His men fought and died like heroes. His dead lay in a distinctly marked line of battle. His left was overpowered, and many of his men being surrounded, were captured.

General Daniel's gallant brigade, by a slight change in the direction of Iverson's attack, had been left too far to his right to assist him directly, and had already become engaged. The right of this brigade coming upon the enemy, strongly posted in a railroad cut, was under its able commander's orders thrown back skillfully, and the position of the whole brigade was altered so as to enable him to throw a portion of his force across the railroad, enfilade it, and attack to advantage. After this change, General Daniel made a most desperate, gallant and entirely successful charge upon the enemy, driving him at all points, but suffering terribly. The conduct of General Daniel and his brigade in this most desperate engagement elicited the admiration and praise of all who witnessed it.

Just as his last effort was made, Ramseur's brigade, which, under my orders, had been so disposed as to support both Iverson and O'Neal, was ordered forward, and was hurled by its commander, with the skill and gallantry for which he is always conspicuous, and with irresistible force, upon the enemy, just where he had repulsed O'Neal and checked Iverson's advance. In the meantime General Early's division had been brought into action on my left with great success, and Doles, thus relieved, without waiting for orders, and though greatly outnumbered, boldly attacked the heavy masses of the enemy in his front. After a short but desperate contest, in which his brigade acted with unsurpassed gallantry, he succeeded in driving them before him, thus achieving on the left, and about the same time, a success no less brilliant than that of Ramseur in the centre, and Daniel on the right. In this affair Doles handled his men with a skill and effect truly admirable, exhibiting marked coolness and courage.

O'Neal's shattered troops, which had assembled without order on the hill, rushed forward, still without order, but with all their usual courage, into the charge. Fry's battery, by my order, was pushed closely after Ramseur.

The Twelfth North Carolina, which had been held well in hand by Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, and the shattered remnants of the other regiments of Iverson's brigade, which had been rallied and organized by Captain D. P. Halsey, A. A. General of the brigade, made under his guidance a dashing and effective charge, just in time to be of considerable service to Ramseur and Daniel, and with them pressed closely after the enemy.

These successes were rapidly followed by a successful attack on

my right, on the part of General A. P. Hill's troops, who renewed their attack in time to put a stop to a murderous enfilade and reverse fire to which, in addition to the heavy direct fire it encountered, Daniel's brigade had been subjected from the time he commenced fairly his final advance.

The enemy was thus routed at all points. My division followed him closely into and through the town, Doles and Ramseur entering in such close contact with the enemy, that the former, who penetrated the heart of the town first of all, had two sharp and successful encounters with the enemy in the streets, and the latter, who entered further to the right, captured the colors of the 150th Pennsylvania regiment in its streets, Lieutenant Harney, of his brigade, tearing them from the hands of the color bearer, and falling almost immediately thereafter mortally wounded.

In the pursuit the division captured about 2,500 prisoners—so many as to embarrass its movements materially.

The troops being greatly exhausted by their march, and somewhat disorganized by the hot engagement and rapid pursuit, were halted and prepared for further action. I did not change their position materially, nor order another attack, for the following reasons:

1st. In the midst of the engagement just described, the corps commander informed me, through one of his officers, that the General commanding did not wish a general engagement brought on, and hence, had it been possible to do so then, I would have stopped the attack at once, but this, of course, it was impossible to do *then*.

2d. Before the completion of his defeat before the town, the enemy had begun to establish a line of battle on the heights back of town, and by the time my line was in a condition to renew the attack, he displayed quite a formidable line of infantry and artillery immediately in my front, extending smartly to my right, and as far as I could see to my left in front of Early. To have attacked this line with my division alone, diminished as it had been by a loss of 2,500 men, would have been absurd. Seeing no Confederate troops at all on my right, finding that General Early, whom I encountered in the streets of the town within thirty minutes after its occupation by our forces, was awaiting further instructions, and receiving no orders to advance, though my superiors were upon the ground, I concluded that the order not to bring on a general engagement was still in force, and hence placed my lines

and skirmishers in a defensive attitude, determined to await orders or further movements, either on the part of Early or the troops on my right. My skirmishers were promptly thrown out, so as to cover more than half the town and the front of the division, which was drawn up in two lines, Doles', Iverson's and Ramseur's brigades making the front line, and extending from the left of the centre of the town along one of its principal streets, and out on the road to Fairfield. The second line, composed of the brigades of Daniel and O'Neal, extended along the railroad, about 200 yards in rear, and considerably to the right of the first. In this position we remained quietly, but with considerable annoyance from the enemy's sharpshooters and artillery, until the morning of the next day.

On the 2d of July nothing of importance transpired in my front. The rest of the men, generally, was only disturbed by the occasional skirmishing and desultory firing of the opposing sharpshooters, but Daniel's brigade, which had been, early in the morning, moved by my orders so as to connect with Pender's division on the crest of the ridge before spoken of, was subjected to a galling artillery fire, especially in the afternoon. Late in the afternoon, however, an attack was made upon the enemy's position by some troops of the right wing of the army, which produced some stir among the enemy in my immediate front, and seemed to cause there a diminution of both artillery and infantry. Orders given during the afternoon, and after the engagement had opened on the right, required me to co-operate with the attacking force as soon as any opportunity of doing so with good effect was offered. Seeing the stir alluded to, I thought that opportunity had come, and immediately sought General Early, with a view of making an attack in concert with him. He agreed with me as to the propriety of attacking, and made preparations accordingly. I hastened to inform the officer commanding the troops on my right (part of Pender's division) that in accordance with our plan I would attack just at dark, and proceeded to make my arrangements; but having to draw my troops out of town by the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then to traverse a distance of twelve or fourteen hundred yards, whilst General Early had to move only half that distance without change of front, the result was, that before I drove the enemy's skirmishers in, General Early had attacked and had been compelled to withdraw. After driving in the enemy's line of skirmishers, the advance line was halted by General Ramseur, who commanded the right brigade, to enable him to report to

me certain important facts (for statement of which I refer to his report) he had discovered as to the nature of the ground and of the defences. These facts, together with Early's withdrawal, of which I had been officially informed, and the increased darkness, convinced me that it would be a useless sacrifice of life to go on, and a recall was ordered. But instead of falling back to the original line, I caused the front line to assume a strong position in the plain to the right of the town, along the hollow of an old road bed. This position was much nearer the enemy, was clear of the town, and was one from which I could readily attack without confusion. The second line was placed in the position originally held by the first. Everything was gotten ready to attack at daylight; but a short time after assuming this new position, I was ordered to send, without delay, all the troops I could spare, without destroying my ability to hold my position, to reinforce Major-General Johnson. As my front line was much more strongly posted than my second, and was fully competent to hold the position, and as the reinforcements had to be in position before daylight, I was compelled to send to General Johnson the troops of my second line—i. e., the brigades of Daniel and O'Neal (excepting the Fifth Alabama). These brigades participated in the engagement on the left, under General Johnson, and remained under his orders until the following night, when our whole corps changed front to rear, so as to extend the line occupied by the other two corps. For a report of their operations on the third July, I have, therefore, to refer respectfully to the report of General Johnson, and to those of General Daniel and Colonel O'Neal, herewith filed.

This order left me powerless to do more than hold my position, unless the enemy should be very much weakened in my front, for I had now remaining but a single thin line, composed of two small brigades, about the third of another, and one regiment the Fifth Alabama, of O'Neal's brigade—in all not over 1,800 men—facing what I believed then, and now, to be the most impregnable portion of the enemy's line of entrenchments. The gallant men and officers of this line held their new position all day on the 3d July, under a sharp and incessant fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, and an occasional artillery fire. The enemy made during the day several ineffectual efforts, by advancing heavy lines of skirmishers, equal almost, if not fully, to my main line and using their artillery to dislodge them from their position.

On the 3d, my orders were general, and the same as those of the

day before, and accordingly when the heavy cannonade indicated that another attack was made from the right wing of our army, we were on the lookout for another "favorable opportunity to co-operate." When the sound of musketry was heard, it became apparent that the enemy in our front was much excited, and the "favorable opportunity" seemed to me close at hand. I sent word to Lieutenant-General Ewell, by Major Whiting of my staff, that in a few moments I should attack, and immediately had my handful of men, under Doles, Iverson and Ramseur, prepared for the onset. But in less than five minutes after Major Whiting's departure, before the troops on my immediate right had made any advance, or showed any preparation therefor, and just as the order "forward" was about to be given to my line, it was announced, and was apparent to me, that the attack had already failed.

This attack was accompanied, preceded, and succeeded by the fiercest and grandest cannonade I have ever witnessed. My troops lay about half way between the artillery of the Second corps, and that of the enemy on Cemetery Hill, and directly under the line of fire of fully one hundred guns; a most trying position even when the opposing artillerists confined their attention to each other, and one which became fearfully so, when both parties, as they did at short intervals, dropped shells in their midst, whilst the sharpshooters were constant and skillful in their attentions. They underwent this terrible trial, not only without murmuring or faltering, but with great cheerfulness, and with the utmost coolness.

It is proper to mention that during the night of the 2d, and on the 3d, my troops did not occupy any portion of the town, except that still held by the sharpshooters of the Alabama brigade, under that promising young officer Major Blackford, of the Fifth Alabama. These sharpshooters, together with those of Doles', Iverson's and Ramseur's brigades, annoyed the enemy's artillery and infantry constantly during the period of our occupation of the town, and acted with rare and praiseworthy gallantry.

During the night of the 3d my division fell back to the ridge which had been wrested from the enemy in the first day's attack, and being reunited, was posted so that the railroad divided it about equally. Expecting to give battle in this position, it was strengthened early on the morning of the 4th. We were not disturbed, however, in the least during the day; in fact, the enemy exhibited so small a force, entered the town and followed us at so late an hour, that it was generally believed he had retreated.

During the day of the 4th, all the wounded who could walk, or be transported in wagons and ambulances, were sent to the rear—many, as it turned out, to be captured or sacrificed in the effort to escape the enemy's cavalry—but near one-half of them, say about 760, were left in the hands of the enemy. This painful result was of course unavoidable. Four surgeons, six assistants, three hospital stewards, and ninety-four attendants were left to attend to the wounded, and with them ten days' supply of such food and medicines as were needed. This was all we could do for them.

Subsequent to the departure of the wounded, Iverson was detached with his brigade as a guard for the train, but unfortunately too late to overtake it and prevent its partial destruction. By a forced march he arrived at Hagerstown soon after the passage of the train, and found a heavy force of the enemy's cavalry driving back our cavalry through the streets. Making a hasty but skillful disposition of his troops, he soon routed them, capturing a considerable number. Great credit is due Brigadier-General Iverson for the handsome and prompt manner in which this affair was managed.

On the night of the 4th we began to fall back towards Hagerstown, by way of Fairfield, bivouacking on the night of the 5th, after a most wearisome march in mud and rain, two miles west of Fairfield.

On the morning of the 6th my division became the rear guard of the army, and early in the morning was attacked by the enemy's skirmishers, deployed over a line extending entirely across the valley, and therefore fully one and a half or two miles long. Later it was attacked from the Emmetsburg road. The morning attack was sharply repulsed by General Daniel's skirmishers on the left and General Doles' on the right of the road, the Forty-fifth North Carolina, Captain Hopkins commanding, having a pretty brisk action on the extreme left, driving the enemy from a commanding position there, in reply to his summons to surrender. General Daniel's loss was only two killed, two wounded and five missing—General Doles' nothing. The other—an extremely feeble attack—was repelled by a few of General Doles' men. The road being entirely clear behind us for four or five miles, at 3½ P. M. we resumed the march, and proceeded, without annoyance or delay, across the mountain, by Monterey Springs, to Waynesburg.

Reaching Hagerstown next day, the division rested there, without serious disturbance until the evening of the 11th, when it was

moved through, and about one and a quarter miles west of Hagerstown, on the National road. Here, during the 13th, 14th and 15th, battle was again, and eagerly by my division, offered to the enemy. During these three days my division occupied the extreme left of the line of battle. Nothing of importance occurred here except a brisk attack of the enemy's skirmishers (after being reinforced), and his cavalry, upon Ramseur's sharpshooters. This attack was made late on the afternoon of the 14th of July, after the withdrawal of nearly all the artillery, and of all the main line of infantry. The enemy had unquestionably discovered this movement. His advance was so firmly and gallantly met by Ramseur's men, and the Second Howitzers, Captain Watson, that he fell back with the loss of many killed and wounded, and about twenty of the cavalry captured.

On the memorable night of the 14th of July, the Second corps fell back to Williamsport, and forded the river. The artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, I had sent off early in the afternoon, with orders to cross at Falling Waters, four miles below Williamsport, on the pontoon bridge which had been placed there. My division waded the river just above the aqueduct over the mouth of the Conococheague; the operation was a perilous one. It was very dark, raining, and excessively muddy. The men had to wade through the aqueduct, down the steep bank of soft and slippery mud, in which numbers lost their shoes, and down which many fell. The water was cold, deep and rising, the lights on either side of the river were dim, just affording enough light to mark the places of entrance and exit, the cartridge boxes of the men had to be placed around their necks—some small men had to be carried over by their comrades—the water was up to the armpits of a full sized man. All the circumstances attending this crossing combined to make it an affair not only involving great hardship, but one of great danger to the men and company officers; but be it said to the everlasting honor of these brave fellows, they encountered it not only promptly, but actually with cheers and laughter. We crossed without the loss of a single man, but I regret to say, with the loss of some 25,000 or 30,000 rounds of ammunition, which were unavoidably wetted and spoiled. After crossing, I marched by orders a short distance beyond "Falling Waters," and then bivouacked—and there ended the Pennsylvania campaign, so far as this division was concerned.

I cannot, however, close this portion of my report without ex-

pressing my pride and admiration of the conduct of the men and officers of this division, from the time it left Grace church until our return to Virginia. Better marching, less straggling, hardships more cheerfully borne, conduct in an enemy's country more commendable and more generally marked by gentlemanly and soldierly characteristics, and finally, better behavior in battle than was exhibited by this division during that period, has not been, and I believe will never be exhibited by any other troops in the service. By their conduct at Gettysburg, I claim to have won the expression from the General commanding the army, who saw their attack on the 1st of July, "I am *proud* of your division." Earnestly do I wish that the name of each officer and private who distinguished himself during this eventful campaign could, with reason, be enrolled here, to be transferred to history. I hope it will yet be done in a different manner. Whilst I cannot mention all who won distinction during this campaign, it is my duty to record here the names of those officers whose conduct, either from my own observation, or from the voluntary testimony of many competent witnesses, I know to have been such as to entitle them to the admiration of brave men, and to the gratitude of a good people.

First among them are Brigadier-Generals Junius Daniel, George Doles, and S. D. Ramseur; Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. Carter, Captain D. P. Halsey, A. A. G. of Iverson's brigade, and Colonel D. H. Christie, Twenty-third North Carolina, who has since died from the wounds he received, and Lieutenant Harney, Company —, Fourteenth North Carolina, of my division, and Brigadier-General A. G. Jenkins and Major Sweeney, of the cavalry brigade. All the field officers, with one exception, are spoken of highly on all hands for their conduct. Appendix B will show what general, field and staff officers were under fire during the engagements. Company officers did their duty nobly. The men, generally, acted in a manner worthy of all praise.

Many valuable lives were lost during the bloody fight at Gettysburg, among them Colonel Christie, already mentioned; Lieutenant-Colonel D. R. E. Winn, Fourth Georgia; Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews, commanding Second North Carolina battalion, and many others. Among the wounded I regret to have to record the names of Colonel F. M. Parker, Thirtieth North Carolina; Lieutenant-Colonel Lumpkin, Forty-fourth Georgia, a most valuable and estimable officer, who lost a leg; Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Johnston

and Major C. C. Blacknall, Twenty-third North Carolina; Colonel J. N. Lightfoot, Sixth Alabama; Colonel R. T. Bennett, Fourteenth North Carolina; Captain Page, commanding battery; Colonel Thomas S. Kenan, Forty-third North Carolina; Lieutenant-Colonel Boyd and Major Winston, of the Forty-fifth North Carolina; Major Lewis, Thirty-second North Carolina; Major Hancock, Second North Carolina battalion; Lieutenant Bond and Colonel Green, of General Daniel's staff, besides many valuable and distinguished company officers, whose names will be found in the tabular statements appended to reports of brigade commanders.

My staff officers, Major H. A. Whiting, Major Green Peyton, Captain W. A. Harris, Captain M. L. Randolph (the two last named officers attached to the division as chiefs of ordnance and of the signal corps respectively, voluntarily serving in the field during the battle with distinguished ability and courage), Lieutenants Hutchinson and Arrington, Captain D. D. Peden, acting A. I. General, and Surgeon W. S. Mitchell, all did their duty nobly during the whole campaign, and deserve mine and the country's warmest thanks for their services. Major Julian Mitchell, acting division commissary (Major Adams having been taken sick at Culpeper courthouse), discharged the duties of his arduous position with an energy and capacity I have never seen equaled.

The appendix marked A will show the strength and the loss of each brigade at Gettysburg. Appendix B will show the general, field and staff officers who were present in the engagements. In the accompanying reports of brigade commanders will be found an account of the operations of each brigade, and the part borne by each in the campaign, in a more detailed form than my limits will admit of, and to these you are respectfully referred.

SKIRMISH AT MANASSAS GAP.

After recrossing the Potomac, with the exception of twenty-four hours spent in an ineffectual effort to strike the Federal force at Hedgesville, the division remained quietly in camp near Darkesville, Berkeley county, until the 22d of July, when it resumed the march up the Valley. Bivouacking at Winchester one night, the next afternoon found us, after a march of twenty-three miles, facing nearly the whole Federal army in the vicinity of Manassas Gap. My division was ordered there to relieve Wright's brigade (of about 600 men), of Anderson's division, but arrived too late to do so. The enemy having already engaged Wright's skirmishers,

it was necessary for his whole brigade to deploy, so as to cover strongly and hold the line which he occupied until I could establish my line of battle a little in its rear. I caused this movement to be executed, acting under General Ewell's orders. These precautions were proper, as the enemy were making an apparently determined advance, with an extended front, and had full 20,000 troops already in view, whilst others were coming through the gap. All my sharpshooters, about 250 men, were, as soon as possible, sent to strengthen Wright's line. Rodes' (old) brigade, under Colonel O'Neal, the first to arrive, was deployed behind Wright's on a ridge some 300 yards in his rear. The main line was strongly posted on a spur of the mountains, which commanded the ridges occupied by Wright and O'Neal. The enemy attacked in force, driving the front line of skirmishers back slowly. Wright's men fought obstinately, as did the sharpshooters. After obtaining possession of the ridge occupied by the first line of skirmishers, the enemy attempted to make a further advance in line of battle, and with a force sufficient to have overwhelmed the first line—which had now rallied at the foot of the ridge—but failed signally, the gallant fellows of that line breaking his solid lines repeatedly. His officers acted generally with great gallantry, but the men behaved in a most cowardly manner. A few shots from Carter's artillery and the skirmishers' fire halted them, broke them, and put a stop to the engagement. Only a few shots were fired by my second line of skirmishers. Of course my main line was not engaged. The fight, if it be worthy that name, took place in full view of the division, and whilst the conduct of our men, and of Wright's particularly, was the subject of admiration, that of the enemy was decidedly puerile.

Wright's brigade lost, I believe, about eighty men, killed and wounded, including amongst the latter Colonel Walker, commanding the brigade. My total loss was fifteen killed, wounded and missing, including one officer of Ramseur's sharpshooters killed. The enemy's loss was, in my opinion, greater than ours. By a prisoner's statements, and from what I saw, the enemy had at least two corps backing his attacking force. General Meade's dispatch from Front Royal next day showed that a very large portion, if not all of his army, was present.

During the night, the pontoons, baggage, &c., having been safely disposed of, my division fell back on the Luray road, about two miles from Front Royal, and bivouacked, Johnson's division re-

maining at Front Royal as rear guard. This day's work, including a march of twenty-seven miles on one of the hottest of summer days, the excitement of a threatened battle, and the night march of four or five miles, damaged the division seriously. Its marches had been admirable up to the time of reaching Front Royal, but for some days after that the men were broken down, and therefore straggled. Fortunately the marches during this period were quite short. Continuing the march leisurely, resting near Luray a day or two, the division arrived at Madison courthouse, by way of Thornton's Gap and Sperryville, on the 29th of July.

In concluding what I have to say about this campaign, I beg leave to call attention to the heroes of it, the men who day by day sacrificed self on the altar of freedom, those barefooted North Carolinians, Georgians and Alabamians, who, with bloody and swollen feet, kept to their ranks, day after day, for weeks. When the division reached Darkesville, near one-half of the men and many officers were barefooted, and fully one-fourth had been so since we crossed the Blue Ridge. These poor fellows had kept up with the column and in rank during the most rapid march of this war, considering its length, over that worst of roads for footmen, the turnpike, and during the hottest days of summer. These are the heroes of the campaign.

I have the honor to be, Colonel,

Yours very respectfully,

R. E. RODES, *Major-General.*

Editorial Paragraphs.

A NUMBER of our friends have complied with our request, and have sent us lists of names of parties likely to subscribe for our PAPERS. We would be glad to have others do so, that we may be able to call the attention of parties interested to the value of our publications. And we are very anxious to secure reliable, efficient agents in all of our principal towns. Our friends will confer a favor by looking out and recommending to us suitable agents, to whom we can pay liberal commissions. We are exceedingly anxious to increase our circulation, and must ask kindly assistance to enable us to do so.

THE ASSOCIATION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA was formed at a meeting of officers and soldiers, held in Richmond, on November 4th, 1870. This association was designed to embrace within its membership representatives of all the States whose soldiers constituted a part of that grand old army, and its objects were to be "the preservation of the friendships that were formed in that army, the perpetuation of its fame, and the vindication of its achievements."

The officers of this association were elected as follows:

President, Lieutenant-General Jubal A. Early; Corresponding Secretary, Colonel Walter H. Taylor; Recording Secretary, Colonel Charles S. Venable; Treasurer, Colonel Charles Marshall.

It was provided that an Executive Committee should be appointed, and that a Vice-President for each State should arrange for the formation of *State Divisions*.

Several State Divisions, we believe, have been organized, and we should be glad to be advised of the organization, names of officers, plans, prospects, indeed everything of interest concerning them all.

THE VIRGINIA DIVISION OF THE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA has had a very efficient organization, and its annual reunions have been very delightful. General Fitz. Lee was its first president, and he was succeeded by General George E. Pickett, whose lamented death occurred while he held the position. The present organization is as follows:

President, General W. H. F. Lee; Treasurer, Major Robert Stiles; Secretaries, Sergeant George L. Christian, Sergeant Leroy S. Edwards.

Vice-Presidents—First, General R. Ransom; second, General H. Heth; third, General A. L. Long; fourth, General Wm. Terry; 5th, Captain D. B. McCorkle.

Executive Committee—General Bradley T. Johnson, Major W. K. Martin, Colonel Thos. H. Carter, Major T. A. Brander, Private Carlton McCarthy.

The annual orators of this division have been as follows: In '72, Wm. H. Payne and Colonel Jos. Mayo (in the absence of General John B. Gordon, orator elect), Colonel Charles S. Venable in 1873, Colonel Charles Marshall in 1874, and Major John W. Daniel in 1875.

The next annual reunion will take place in Richmond, on the first of November.

The chosen orator is Captain W. Gordon McCabe, who will discuss as his subject, "PETERSBURG IN 1864-5." There will also be a banquet.

Applicants for membership in this association will be furnished with proper blanks on addressing either of the secretaries. The charges are: annual membership fee, \$1; certificate of membership (beautifully engraved), \$1; badge, \$2. We would urge all survivors of the *Virginia Division of the Army of Northern Virginia* to unite with this organization.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR ARCHIVES continue to come in. Among the more valuable received since our last acknowledgement, we may mention the following:

From Mrs. V. Hortense Rodes, Tuscaloosa, Alabama—General R. E. Rodes' reports of the Gettysburg campaign, Chancellorsville, Seven Pines, and the First Maryland campaign.

From Mrs. A. J. Graves, Baltimore—Fifteen scrap books filled with newspaper clippings for the years 1860-65, very carefully selected and arranged in chronological order.

From Rev. Geo. W. Peterkin, Baltimore—Roster of the artillery of Army Northern Virginia, copied from an original morning return which came into his possession while serving on the staff of General W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery Army Northern Virginia.

From General R. L. T. Beale, of Virginia—A narrative of the part borne by the Ninth Virginia cavalry, in resisting the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren raid, together with a statement which establishes fully the authenticity of the infamous Dahlgren papers.

From General Dabney H. Maury, of Virginia—His recollections of the Elkhorn campaign.

From W. Baird, Esq., of Essex county, Virginia—A Review of the first volume of the Count of Paris' History of the Civil War in America.

From Carlton McCarthy, Esq., of Richmond—Two papers on *Detailed Minutes of Soldier Life*.

From Geo. T. Whittington, Alexandria—First morning report of troops at Manassas Junction, under command of Major Cornelius Boyle, May 6th, 1861.

From Judge B. R. Wellford—Supplemental report of Confederate States Secretary of War (March 17th, 1862), embracing the correspondence in reference to the first cartel for the exchange of prisoners.

Other acknowledgments and book notices crowded out.